In the fourth part , it gives the definition of bayesian nash equilibrium in the static game of incomplete information and discusses the game of sealed auction and draws some conclusions according to it 討論了密封拍賣中的博弈現(xiàn)象,得到投標(biāo)人的最優(yōu)出價(jià)方案,說明了招標(biāo)方期望更多經(jīng)濟(jì)人參加競標(biāo)的必然性。
During the fifth part , we introduce perfect bayesian nash equilibrium , which is the optimal solution of dynamic game of incomplete information , meanwhile , analyze the reason of an abnormal phenomenon in chinese stock markets 第五部分介紹了不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈的最優(yōu)均衡? ?完美貝葉斯納什均衡。分析了中國股市中一些“垃圾股”走俏為熱門股的現(xiàn)象。
In accordance with the information unsymmetry during disposal of rent - seeking , we establish three incomplete information dynamic models involving government inspection departments and groups for profits , and then give their sub - game refined bayesian nash equilibrium respectively 摘要針對(duì)尋租治理過程中存在的信息不對(duì)稱性,建立了政府稽查部門和利益集團(tuán)之間的三個(gè)不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)模型,給出了各自的子博弈精煉貝葉斯納什均衡。
Following this idea , considering the serious information asymmetry and personal expect utility maximization in the double auction , we intends to construct a bidding model on bayesian nash equilibrium based on incomplete information games , consequently obtain a solution on each private values and maximum forecast price and minimum forecast price on the marketing . then , we analyze in detail the characters and possibilities of the offer strategy by means of computer simulation according to the experimental economics 在此基礎(chǔ)上,考慮到雙向拍賣中存在的信息嚴(yán)重不對(duì)稱和個(gè)人期望效用最大化,構(gòu)造了該拍賣模式中基于不完全信息博弈的貝葉斯納什均衡模型并求解,獲得一個(gè)關(guān)于各自估價(jià)和市場(chǎng)最高及最低預(yù)測(cè)價(jià)格的線性函數(shù)的報(bào)價(jià)策略。